Arms in the Skies: Geopolitics and Risk in the 2024 Global Airpower Race

Executive summary

Global airpower in 2024 is extraordinarily concentrated.

On the most sophisticated comparative index in open sources—the World Directory of Modern Military Aircraft (WDMMA) “TrueValueRating” (TvR)—the top ten air services are, in descending order, as follows.

(1) United States Air Force, the United States Navy

(2) Russian Air Force, United States Army Aviation, the United States Marine Corps,

(3) Indian Air Force

(4) People’s Liberation Army Air Force of China,

(5) Japan Air Self‑Defense Force,

(6) Israeli Air Force,

(7) French Air and Space Force.

This ranking is not a mere count of aircraft; it blends inventory size with force structure, modernization, logistics, industrial depth, and combat experience.

The United States remains in a league of its own.

Its four principal aviation services together possess a combined TVR roughly three and a half times that of Russia’s entire air and naval aviation, and equivalent to the following ten countries combined.

Russia and China retain substantial, increasingly modern forces, but they are still outclassed in terms of global reach, high‑end enablers, and depth of precision‑strike networks.

India stands out as the only non‑US, non‑Chinese service within the top tier, edging the Chinese air force on WDMMA’s quality‑weighted metric despite China’s larger overall fleet.

Beneath these headline numbers lies a more unsettling reality.

Airpower is in the midst of a disruptive transition, influenced by precision missiles, dense air defenses, ubiquitous sensors, and low‑cost drones, as revealed starkly in Ukraine and the South Caucasus.

Senior leaders across the major air forces speak of an urgent need to modernise:

(1) US Air Force secretary warns that transformation is essential to compete with the “pacing challenge – China, China, China,”

(2) Beijing openly seeks a “world‑class” military by mid‑century.

(3) Indian Air Force leadership describes a deliberate evolution into an “Indian Air and Space Force.”

The coming decade will test whether the established top ten can retain their relative advantage as sixth‑generation fighters, collaborative combat aircraft, space‑enabled command networks, and massed autonomous systems redefine what “airpower” actually means.

Introduction

Measuring global airpower in 2024

Ranking the Air Force is inherently contentious because “power” is multi‑dimensional. Raw fleet-size tables, such as Global Firepower’s listing of total military aircraft—where the United States, Russia, China, and India occupy the first four positions—capture only one aspect of capability.

They do not distinguish between obsolescent and fifth‑generation fighters, between token tanker fleets and robust global lift, or between paper squadrons and units capable of sustained high‑intensity operations.

For 2024, the most analytically transparent public attempt to address these nuances is WDMMA’s Global Air Powers Ranking.

Its TrueValueRating aggregates factors including

(1) Overall mix of combat

(2) Special‑mission, bomber

(3) Training and support aircraft

(4) The presence of dedicated strategic bombers and close air support platforms

(5) Logistics and maintenance depth

(6) The health of the domestic aerospace industry

(7) The degree of modernization and operational experience.

In this framework, the United States Air Force achieves the maximum TvR score of 242.9, with a tracked inventory of approximately 5,189 aircraft, ranging from intercontinental bombers and stealth fighters to tankers, transports, and a large special‑mission fleet.

The 2024 top ten, using this TVR methodology, consists of

(1) United States Air Force; the United States Navy’s aviation arm.

(2) Russian Air Force.

(3) United States Marine Corps aviation arm.

(4) Indian Air Force.

(5) People’s Liberation Army Air Force.

(6) Japan Air Self‑Defense Force.

(7) Israeli Air Force.

(8) the French Air and Space Force, with TVR scores ranging from 242.9 at the top to 56.3 in tenth place.

This ranking is the empirical backbone for the analysis that follows.

The 2024 top ten: structural profiles

At the apex, the United States Air Force combines global reach.

(1) A unique triad of strategic bombers

(2) Extensive aerial refueling,

(3) Rapidly growing fifth‑generation fighter fleet.

Its TVR of 242.9 and more than 5,000 tracked aircraft reflect not only quantity but also the breadth of mission sets, supported by a robust domestic aerospace industrial base and a large pipeline of on‑order assets such as the B‑21 Raider and future fighters.

The United States Navy’s air arm occupies the second position with a TvR of 142.4 and about 2,626 aircraft, built around carrier air wings with F/A‑18E/F and F‑35C fighters, complemented by maritime patrol aircraft, airborne early‑warning platforms, and helicopters.

Its strength lies in sea‑based power projection and anti‑submarine warfare rather than massed land‑based air dominance, but WDMMA’s methodology recognises its global operational footprint.

Third place is held by the Russian Air Force, with a TvR of 114.2 and roughly 3,652 aircraft, including a sizeable inventory of Su‑30, Su‑34, and Su‑35 multirole fighters and strike aircraft, as well as legacy MiG and Su platforms.

Despite attrition and sanctions, it retains a large combat inventory and bomber force.

However, the war in Ukraine has exposed severe limitations in maintenance, munitions stockpiles, and suppression of enemy air defenses.

Unusually, fourth and fifth places belong not to foreign services but to United States Army Aviation and the United States Marine Corps.

Army Aviation, with about 4,397 aircraft and a TvR of 112.6, fields an enormous rotary‑wing and tilt‑rotor fleet, crucial for mobility, attack and reconnaissance in support of land forces.

The Marine Corps, with 1,211 aircraft and a TvR of 85.3, brings short‑takeoff F‑35B jets, attack helicopters and tilt‑rotors tailored to expeditionary and amphibious warfare.

Their inclusion underscores that airpower is not confined to air forces in the narrow institutional sense.

The Indian Air Force sits in sixth place, with a TvR of 69.4 and an inventory of about 1,645 aircraft.

It operates a heterogeneous mix of Su‑30MKI heavy fighters, Rafales, upgraded MiG‑29s and Mirage 2000s, Jaguar strike aircraft and a growing number of indigenous Tejas light fighters, supported by tankers, transports and AWACS platforms.

WDMMA’s data suggest that, on a quality‑weighted basis, the IAF marginally outperforms China’s PLAAF despite having fewer aircraft overall.

Seventh is the People’s Liberation Army Air Force of China, with some 2,084 aircraft and a TvR of 63.8.

The PLAAF has undergone rapid modernization, fielding J‑10C and J‑16 multirole fighters and an expanding fleet of J‑20 stealth fighters, while integrating airborne early warning and refuelling capabilities. Its lower TvR relative to the IAF reflects, in this model, a mix of legacy platforms and ongoing transitions.

The Japan Air Self‑Defense Force is ranked eighth, with a TvR of 58.1 and around 779 aircraft. It combines upgraded F‑15Js, F‑2s and an expanding F‑35A fleet with sophisticated air‑defense and command‑and‑control systems, heavily oriented toward defending Japanese airspace and deterring regional adversaries.

Ninth place goes to the Israeli Air Force, with a TvR of 58.0 and approximately 581 aircraft.

Israel’s fleet includes F‑35I “Adir” stealth fighters, F‑15 and F‑16 variants, a dense network of unmanned systems and advanced electronic warfare and intelligence platforms.

Its relatively modest size masks a high level of training, integrated air and missile defense and extensive combat experience in complex airspace.

Rounding out the top ten is the French Air and Space Force, with a TvR of 56.3 and roughly 501 aircraft.

France’s Rafale fleet, supported by tankers, transports and ISR assets, underpins independent expeditionary operations in Africa, the Middle East and Europe, complemented by a capable naval aviation arm ranked separately

Key developments shaping the 2024 balance

Several structural and programmatic developments are reshaping the airpower hierarchy.

In the United States, the Department of the Air Force has embarked on a sweeping modernization drive.

Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall has repeatedly argued that it is not enough to sustain legacy fleets; the service must field new systems aligned with “seven operational imperatives” to remain competitive with its “pacing challenge – China, China, China.”

He has publicly tied the fiscal year 2024 budget to funding for the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) sixth‑generation fighter, around one thousand Collaborative Combat Aircraft (uncrewed loyal wingmen) and rapid development of the B‑21 Raider stealth bomber, emphasising the need to “get it into production as quickly as possible.”

This modernization push aims to preserve the USAF’s dominant TvR lead into the 2030s.

China, meanwhile, is accelerating its transformation under Xi Jinping’s directive that the People’s Liberation Army become a “world‑class” military by 2049.

Authoritative analyses of PLA planning note that Beijing has set 2035 as a milestone for “initial transformation” and seeks to achieve “intelligentized” warfare capabilities, integrating unmanned systems, cyber and space assets.

Xi has personally inspected PLA Air Force units, stressing the need to “speed up modernization and expand realism in combat training,” enhance human capital and intensify fielding of new equipment.

This agenda underpins continued expansion of the J‑20 fleet, development of new bombers and integration of long‑range strike and air‑defense systems.

India’s airpower trajectory is marked by a dual emphasis on indigenous capability and doctrinal evolution.

The Chief of Air Staff has described a deliberate transition toward becoming an “Indian Air and Space Force,” highlighting that “efficient exploitation of space is critical” to operations and that the service is developing a “comprehensive space ecosystem” to project military space capabilities.

He has linked this evolution to the Indian defence minister’s call for the IAF to become an aerospace force capable of meeting future challenges, and has foregrounded initiatives in indigenous radar, weapons and sensors under the broader Atmanirbhar Bharat (self‑reliance) strategy.

Programmes such as the Tejas Mk1A, planned Tejas Mk2, AMCA stealth fighter and domestic UAVs will shape India’s medium‑term TvR.

Japan and France have both committed to significant recapitalisation.

Japan is increasing F‑35 procurement, considering future fighter collaboration with the United Kingdom and Italy under the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), and investing in integrated air and missile defence to address the North Korean and Chinese missile threat.

France is upgrading its Rafale fleet, modernising command‑and‑control networks and deepening its integration with NATO’s air and missile defence architecture, while simultaneously supporting the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) project.

Russia presents a more ambiguous picture.

On paper, its third‑place ranking and large fleet size suggest formidable strength.

In practice, operational experience over Ukraine has highlighted serious constraints in precision munitions stocks, suppression of enemy air defences and pilot training.

At the same time, Russia has sustained aircraft production under sanctions, continued limited deployment of Su‑57 fighters, and maintained strategic bomber patrols, preserving a substantial if battered TvR.

Facts and concerns: what the numbers obscure

The WDMMA ranking generates several sobering observations.

The first is the sheer dominance of the United States in aggregate airpower.

According to the WDMMA‑based analysis, the combined TvR of US air services is around 583.2, almost three and a half times Russia’s total and equivalent to the next ten countries together.

This reflects not just aircraft numbers but the unrivalled density of enablers—tankers, ISR platforms, training fleets, industrial base and logistical networks. Yet US leaders are explicit that this edge is not guaranteed.

As one senior officer has put it in a related context, “air superiority is not a birthright”; it must be constantly re‑earned through modernization and training.

The second is that fleet size alone can be misleading.

Global Firepower data on total aircraft show Russia and China ahead of India in absolute numbers, and South Korea entering the top five by fleet size, yet on TvR the Indian Air Force ranks above the PLAAF due to its inventory mix and level of modernization.

Similarly, smaller but technologically advanced forces like those of Israel, Japan and France punch far above their weight.

Third, several of the top‑ten air forces are grappling with ageing platforms and readiness challenges.

The United States still operates large numbers of legacy F‑15C/Ds, F‑16s and A‑10s, as well as ageing tankers and early warning aircraft, many of which must be retired to fund next‑generation systems.

Russia remains heavily reliant on airframes with roots in Soviet designs, with modernization uneven across fleets. India continues to operate MiG‑21 variants, albeit in dwindling numbers, alongside its modern Su‑30MKI and Rafale squadrons.

Fourth, the character of airpower is changing under the pressure of modern integrated air defences, long‑range precision fires and pervasive unmanned systems.

Conflicts in Ukraine and elsewhere have demonstrated that manned fixed‑wing aircraft operating near the front line face unprecedented risk from mobile SAMs, MANPADS, loitering munitions and cheap drones.

This erodes the traditional assumption that top‑tier air forces can always secure uncontested airspace against non‑peer adversaries, and drives investment toward stand‑off munitions, stealth, electronic warfare and high‑volume uncrewed systems.

Finally, there is the concern of strategic over‑stretch. Many top‑ten air forces are expected to perform simultaneously as homeland defenders, expeditionary strike arms, nuclear delivery platforms and symbols of national prestige.

The multiplicity of roles—especially for the US, French and, increasingly, Indian air forces—strains limited pilot cadres, maintenance crews and budgetary resources.

Voices from the top: what global leaders are saying

Senior political and military leaders are candid about both aspirations and anxieties.

In the United States, Frank Kendall has framed modernization as a non‑negotiable response to the challenge from China.

Addressing a major Air and Space Forces conference, he emphasised that the department is “united in our commitment to modernizing the Air and Space Forces and in achieving the transformation we must have to be competitive with our pacing challenge – China, China, China.”

He outlined a portfolio centred on NGAD, Collaborative Combat Aircraft and B‑21, noting that “hard choices” were necessary to retire legacy systems and free resources for next‑generation capabilities.

From Beijing’s side, Xi Jinping has repeatedly instructed the PLA to accelerate its transformation.

Directing the armed forces to become a “world‑class” military by 2049, he has called for speeding up modernization, increasing the realism of training, expanding “new domain forces” in cyber and space, and enhancing deterrence by more frequent deployments.

In visits to PLA Air Force units, he has underlined the need to field new equipment rapidly, integrate it into joint operations, and intensify combat preparedness.

The US Department of Defense assesses that the PLAAF is “modernizing and indigenizing its aircraft and unmanned aerial systems rapidly, matching U.S. standards” in key domains.

Indian leaders articulate a complementary but distinct vision.

The Chief of the Air Staff has stated that “as is the case with most modern Air Forces, an efficient exploitation of space is critical to the IAF’s operations,” and that the service has “taken a conscious decision to expand its operations beyond the threshold of military space services and applications into the realm of space operations to transform itself into an Indian Air and Space Force.”

He has tied this directly to the defence minister’s exhortation that the IAF must become an aerospace force capable of defending India from future challenges, and has stressed that “IAF is fully committed towards the Nation’s vision of achieving Atmanirbharta,” citing in‑house R&D and innovation programmes.

These statements illustrate a common thread across the top ten: all recognise that the era of simple fleet recapitalisation is over.

Future airpower will be defined by integration with space and cyber, autonomy, data and industrial resilience under conditions of budgetary constraint and strategic competition.

Steps ahead: trajectories for the top ten

The immediate future of global airpower will likely be shaped by several converging trajectories.

(1) The first is the emergence of manned–unmanned teaming and massed autonomous systems.

The United States is institutionalising this through its Collaborative Combat Aircraft programme, envisaging around one thousand uncrewed systems operating alongside fighters to provide “affordable mass.”

Other top‑ten forces, including China, Israel, France and India, are pursuing their own swarms, loyal wingmen and high‑end UAVs.

The air forces that best integrate these platforms into doctrine, training and command structures will enjoy a step‑change in combat mass and survivability.

(2) The second is the blurring of boundaries between air and space.

The US Space Force, China’s space warfare capabilities and India’s aspiration to become an “Air and Space Force” all point toward an integrated aerospace domain in which persistent ISR, precision navigation, beyond‑line‑of‑sight communications and kinetic and non‑kinetic counterspace capabilities underpin aerial operations.

Japan and France are also expanding military space units and doctrines.

Over time, rankings based purely on aircraft may give way to broader “aerospace power” indices.

(3) The third is the race for sixth‑generation fighter ecosystems.

The US NGAD programme, Europe’s FCAS and GCAP projects, and emerging Chinese efforts will, if successful, create families of platforms around stealthy crewed aircraft, uncrewed adjuncts, advanced sensors and adaptive engines.

The timelines, costs and industrial risks associated with these projects are enormous; failures or delays will have profound consequences for national TvR scores and for alliance balances.

(4) The fourth is the challenge of sustaining readiness under fiscal and demographic pressure. Highly trained pilots, mission‑capable aircraft and robust munitions stockpiles are expensive and time‑consuming to build.

Many top‑ten forces face pilot shortages, maintenance backlogs and munitions shortfalls, exacerbated by high operational tempos.

The ability to modernise while stabilising readiness will differentiate those who can turn notional strength into usable power from those whose rankings are increasingly theoretical.

Finally, there is the question of doctrinal adaptation. Air forces that cling to legacy notions of uncontested air superiority and deep strike without adequate counter‑UAS, electronic warfare and integrated air and missile defence may find their exquisite platforms constrained by operational realities.

Those that re‑imagine airpower for highly contested, sensor‑saturated environments—and practise joint operations accordingly—will be better positioned irrespective of raw fleet metrics.

Geopolitics and risk assessment of global airpower race

The intensifying competition among the top ten air forces in 2024 is reshaping the geopolitical balance in ways that are both stabilising and inherently volatile.

On one hand, the overwhelming preponderance of American airpower, bolstered by sophisticated allies such as Japan, Israel and France, underwrites deterrence architectures that complicate the calculus of revisionist actors and help to prevent opportunistic aggression.

On the other hand, the rapid qualitative improvements pursued by China, the determined modernisation of India, and Russia’s efforts to preserve a credible aerospace deterrent despite attrition and sanctions create a dynamic in which perceptions of relative decline or breakthrough can prompt risk‑acceptant behaviour.

This is particularly acute in contested regions such as the Western Pacific, the Himalayan frontier and Eastern Europe, where highly capable air forces operate in close proximity, under compressed decision timelines and with overlapping nuclear and conventional signalling.

In such landscapes, the mere belief that a rival is about to field a decisive new combination of stealth, autonomous systems and space‑enabled targeting can generate pre‑emptive incentives, miscalculation or coercive brinkmanship.

From a risk‑assessment perspective, the airpower race introduces a layered set of vulnerabilities that extend far beyond traditional metrics of fleet size or sortie generation.

The deepening fusion of air, space, cyber and autonomous systems means that states are increasingly reliant on fragile constellations of satellites, data links and software architectures that are susceptible to disruption, espionage and cascading failure.

This heightens escalation risks: a cyberattack or ambiguous interference against an integrated air‑and‑space network may be interpreted as a prelude to kinetic operations, incentivising rapid counter‑moves.

Simultaneously, the enormous fiscal and industrial investment required for sixth‑generation ecosystems and massed uncrewed platforms can entrench security dilemmas, as political leaders become reluctant to accept restraint after committing national prestige and scarce capital to transformational programmes.

The central strategic question is whether leading air powers can embed arms‑race stability mechanisms—transparency measures, crisis‑communication channels, norms on counterspace and autonomous weapons—fast enough to prevent the emergent aerospace competition from turning technological advantage into strategic fragility.

Conclusion

The 2024 global airpower ranking highlights both continuity and flux.

Continuity is evident in the overwhelming pre‑eminence of the United States, the substantial though imperfect capabilities of Russia and China, and the enduring quality of forces such as those of Israel, Japan and France.

Flux is visible in India’s rise into the top tier, in the emergence of space and autonomy as defining arenas, and in the growing recognition that old models of air dominance are under siege from new technologies and adversary adaptations.

The WDMMA and its TrueValueRating offers a more nuanced lens than simple aircraft counts, revealing that quality, balance, industrial depth and operational integration matter at least as much as fleet size.

It shows an airpower landscape where the United States towers above all others, but where ambitious competitors are rapidly closing specific gaps and where even smaller nations can achieve disproportionate effect through technology and doctrine.

Statements by leaders from Washington, Beijing and New Delhi converge on a single point: the next two to three decades will decide whether today’s top air forces can successfully transform themselves into aerospace powers suited to an era of great‑power rivalry and technological disruption.

The ranking of 2024 is therefore not a fixed hierarchy but a snapshot taken in the midst of profound change.

How each of the top ten navigates modernization, integration and adaptation will determine whether it still occupies a premier place when the next generation of airpower is finally defined.