Mexico’s Historic Judicial Elections: A Comprehensive Analysis of the World’s First Nationwide Popular Vote for Judges

Introduction

Mexico made history on June 1, 2025, by conducting the world’s first nationwide judicial elections. These elections fundamentally transformed how judges are selected, potentially reshaping the country’s legal system.

This unprecedented reform replaced Mexico’s traditional merit-based appointment system with popular elections for nearly all judicial positions, from Supreme Court justices to local judges, making Mexico an outlier among democratic nations.

The elections saw approximately 7,700 candidates competing for over 2,600 judicial positions, including all nine Supreme Court justices. They represented the most extensive overhaul of a court system undertaken by any major democracy.

While proponents argue this will democratize the judiciary and eliminate corruption, critics warn it could undermine judicial independence, facilitate organized crime infiltration, and erode democratic checks and balances.

Background and Origins of the Reform

The judicial reform emerged from an intense political conflict between former President Andrés Manuel López Obrador and Mexico’s judiciary, which had repeatedly blocked his key initiatives and constitutional proposals.

López Obrador consistently criticized the courts as corrupt, political, and riddled with nepotism, arguing they represented an elite disconnected from ordinary citizens.

The breaking point came when Mexico’s Supreme Court struck down López Obrador’s proposal to place the National Guard under military command, leading him to declare that the judiciary needed to be made “more democratic.”

This confrontation escalated into a constitutional battle over Mexico's separation of powers and judicial independence.

The reform process itself was remarkably swift and controversial. López Obrador submitted the proposal to Congress on February 5, 2024, and both chambers approved it within months.

The ruling Morena party, led by López Obrador and supported by his successor, Claudia Sheinbaum, leveraged its qualified majority in Congress to pass the amendments with minimal modifications.

The reform was officially published in Mexico’s Federal Official Gazette on September 15, 2024, just one day before Mexico’s Independence Day, symbolically marking a new chapter in the country’s judicial history.

Critics have noted that the Mexican government admitted to conducting no prior diagnostic study for this sweeping reform, raising questions about its evidence-based foundation.

The constitutional amendments modified 27 articles of Mexico’s Constitution, fundamentally restructuring how judges are selected and the entire architecture of the judicial branch.

The reform reduces the Supreme Court from 11 to 9 justices and shortens their terms from 15 to 12 years. It also establishes new oversight bodies, including a Judicial Discipline Tribunal with unprecedented powers to investigate and sanction judges.

Additionally, the reform introduces the concept of “faceless” judges for organized crime cases and imposes salary caps to ensure that no judge earns more than the president.

These changes represent the most comprehensive transformation of Mexico’s judiciary since the country’s democratic transition in the late 20th century.

The Electoral Process and Mechanics

The June 1, 2025, elections began a two-phase process designed to replace Mexico’s judiciary through popular vote.

Approximately 881 federal judicial positions were contested in the first round, including all nine Supreme Court justices, magistrates for the new Judicial Discipline Tribunal, and hundreds of circuit magistrates and district judges.

The remaining half of federal judicial positions will be elected in 2027, ensuring a complete overhaul of the judicial branch within López Obrador’s successor administration. Additionally, 19 states conducted simultaneous local judicial elections, adding nearly 2,000 more positions to the ballot.

The candidate selection process represented a significant departure from Mexico’s traditional merit-based system, which required extensive legal experience and career progression through the judiciary.

Under the old system, candidates began as junior clerks. They advanced through notifiers and senior law clerks before qualifying for judgeships through rigorous examinations that tested their legal knowledge, judgment-writing skills, and decision-making abilities before panels of senior judges.

The new system still required candidates to meet basic qualifications, including Mexican citizenship by birth, a law degree with minimum grades, and five years of professional experience.

However, it eliminated the career progression requirements and institutional vetting processes.

Evaluation committees from the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches were responsible for assessing applicants and selecting final candidates, though this process sparked immediate controversy.

Political parties are prohibited from participating or publicly supporting candidates, though several candidates are known to have political affiliations.

The National Electoral Institute oversees the judicial elections, with public and private funding, media space purchases, and explicitly banned political party campaigning.

This creates a unique electoral environment where candidates must rely on their professional credentials and personal networks rather than traditional political machinery.

Opposition and International Concerns

The judicial reform has faced unprecedented opposition from multiple quarters, including international organizations, civil society groups, and Mexico’s judicial workers.

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights expressed grave concerns about the reform’s potential impact on judicial independence, access to justice, and the rule of law, urging Mexican authorities to ensure the changes align with the American Convention on Human Rights.

The IACHR specifically warned about the hasty implementation of profound modifications without a thorough assessment of Mexico’s real challenges in access to justice.

Similarly, the United Nations and various academic institutions have raised alarms about the potential erosion of democratic institutions.

Domestic opposition has been equally intense, with judicial workers conducting nationwide strikes and protests leading to the elections.

The most dramatic moment occurred when protesters stormed the Senate building on the day the reform was approved, highlighting the deep divisions within Mexican society over the changes.

Opposition political parties, including the National Action Party (PAN) and the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), voted against the reform in congressional committees, arguing it would undermine Mexico’s system of checks and balances.

Legal experts and civil society organizations like Juicio Justo have characterized the reform as an attempt by the ruling party to control the judiciary, which has served as a crucial counterbalance to executive power.

International legal scholars have been particularly critical of the reform’s potential implications for judicial independence and democratic governance.

Argentine scholar Roberto Gargarella described the election of judges in this manner as “one of the greatest institutional tragedies of our time,” reflecting broader concerns about populist attacks on judicial institutions globally.

The Brennan Center for Justice has documented how judicial elections in other contexts can create pressures that make judges more punitive and less independent, particularly in criminal cases where electoral considerations may influence sentencing decisions.

These international perspectives suggest that Mexico’s reform may be floundering in the face of global best practices in judicial governance.

Potential Impact on Mexico’s Legal System

The transition from appointment-based to election-based judicial selection will fundamentally alter how justice is administered in Mexico, with implications extending far beyond the selection process.

Research from the United States, where some states elect judges, demonstrates that electoral pressures can significantly impact judicial decision-making, particularly in criminal cases.

Judges facing re-election tend to impose harsher sentences and are more likely to affirm death penalties.

In Mexico’s context, where organized crime wields considerable influence, these dynamics could be even more pronounced, potentially leading to judicial decisions influenced by electoral considerations rather than legal precedent and constitutional principles.

The reform’s impact on Mexico’s fight against corruption and organized crime presents a complex challenge.

While proponents argue that popular elections will make judges more accountable to citizens and less susceptible to elite corruption, critics warn that the opposite effect is more likely.

Organized crime groups have already shown strategic interest in judicial elections, recognizing that gaining influence over judges could give them unprecedented power to secure favorable rulings and evade prosecution.

The fact that some candidates include former lawyers for major cartel leaders and individuals with criminal convictions has heightened these concerns.

The structural changes to Mexico’s Supreme Court will also reshape the country’s constitutional jurisprudence and separation of powers.

The reduction from 11 to 9 justices and the limitation of Amparo protections mean that constitutional challenges to government actions will be more difficult to sustain and have more limited effects.

Previously, Mexican judges could extend constitutional protections to third parties through amparo procedures, but the reform restricts these protections to the original plaintiffs.

This represents a significant weakening of constitutional safeguards and could make it easier for the government to implement controversial policies without adequate judicial oversight.

Global Context and Comparisons

Mexico’s judicial election system places it in a tiny group of countries worldwide that elect judges through popular vote, joining only Bolivia at the national level.

This makes Mexico a global outlier among democratic nations, most of which rely on appointment systems designed to insulate judges from political pressures.

While some U.S. states conduct judicial elections and certain Swiss localities elect local judges, no other major democracy has implemented such a comprehensive electoral system for its entire judiciary.

This isolation raises questions about whether Mexico is pioneering a new model of democratic accountability or embarking on a dangerous experiment with unpredictable consequences.

Comparative research on judicial elections, primarily from the United States, provides sobering insights into the potential consequences of Mexico’s reform.

Studies consistently show that elected judges face pressures that can compromise their independence and impartiality, particularly in high-profile criminal cases where public opinion strongly favors harsh punishment.

These pressures are amplified during election cycles, when judges may alter their decision-making to avoid attack advertisements portraying them as “soft on crime.”

The Brennan Center for Justice found that judicial election dynamics systematically favor prosecutors over defendants, potentially undermining the presumption of innocence and other fundamental due process rights.

The broader global trend has been toward strengthening judicial independence through appointment systems and institutional safeguards, making Mexico’s reform particularly noteworthy for moving in the opposite direction.

Countries throughout Latin America have amended their constitutions over the past fifteen years to improve judicial selection processes and reduce political influence, though with mixed success.

Mexico’s reform contradicts these efforts and may signal a new phase in the region’s ongoing struggles with judicial independence and democratic governance.

The international legal community will likely view Mexico’s experience as a crucial test case for whether popular judicial elections coexist with democratic rule of law principles.

Conclusion

Mexico’s historic judicial elections represent a bold experiment in democratic governance that could fundamentally reshape the country’s legal system and its relationship between popular sovereignty and judicial independence.

While the reform addressed legitimate concerns about corruption and elite capture in Mexico’s judiciary, the implementation process and early indicators suggest significant risks to democratic institutions and the rule of law.

The unprecedented nature of electing judges at all levels of government places Mexico in uncharted territory, with potential consequences extending far beyond its borders as other nations observe this experiment in judicial democracy.

The success or failure of Mexico’s judicial elections will likely depend on whether the new system can maintain the delicate balance between democratic accountability and judicial independence, which is essential for effective governance.

Early signs, including the controversial candidate selection process, concerns about organized crime infiltration, and international criticism, suggest substantial challenges ahead.

The 2027 elections for the remaining judicial positions will provide another crucial test of the system’s viability.

They may determine whether this reform represents a genuine democratization of Mexico’s judiciary or an erosion of institutional safeguards protecting democratic governance.

The international community will continue monitoring Mexico’s experience closely, as it may influence debates about judicial reform and democratic institutions worldwide.