The Asianisation of Regional Security Architecture: Shifting Power Dynamics in the Indo-Pacific

Introduction

The regional security architecture in Asia is undergoing its most significant transformation since the 1950s, when the U.S.-led hub-and-spoke system was established.

FAF analysis points driven by China’s assertiveness, the erosion of U.S. unilateral dominance, and the rise of middle powers, a new paradigm is emerging that prioritizes Asian-led mechanisms and diversified partnerships.

While the traditional hub-and-spoke model—centered on U.S. bilateral alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and others—remains foundational, it is increasingly supplemented by multilateral frameworks, intra-Asian defense cooperation, and China’s vision of a Sinocentric order.

This shift reflects the region’s economic interdependence with China and its strategic hedging against Beijing’s territorial ambitions, resulting in a fragmented yet dynamic security landscape where multilateralism competes with transactional bilateralism.

Historical Foundations: The Hub-and-Spoke System and Its Limitations

Origins of the U.S.-Led Security Architecture

The post-Korean War security order in Asia was built on a network of bilateral alliances, often termed the “hub-and-spoke” system, with the U.S. as the central hub and regional states as spokes.

This structure ensured American military primacy, deterred Soviet expansion during the Cold War and provided security guarantees to allies like Japan and South Korea.

The absence of a NATO-style multilateral pact in Asia was deliberate, reflecting U.S. preferences for flexible, asymmetric partnerships that avoided entanglements in regional disputes.

By the 2000s, this system had expanded to include partnerships with India and Vietnam, albeit without formal mutual defense commitments.

Structural Weaknesses and Changing Realities

The hub-and-spoke model’s limitations became apparent as China’s economic and military rise accelerated. While reliant on U.S. security assurances, ASEAN countries grew economically dependent on China, creating a “security-economy decoupling.”

Meanwhile, U.S. political dysfunction and budget cuts under the Trump administration raised doubts about Washington’s long-term commitment, prompting allies like Japan and Australia to diversify their security ties.

The system’s rigidity also struggled to address non-traditional threats such as cyberattacks, climate change, and maritime piracy, which demanded multilateral solutions.

China’s Vision: From “Asia for Asians” to a Sinocentric Order

Xi Jinping’s Normative Challenge

In 2014, President Xi Jinping articulated the “Asian Security Concept,” declaring that “Asia’s security should be upheld by Asians themselves”.

This rhetoric, framed as a rejection of Cold War-era U.S. “hegemony,” sought to position China as the natural leader of a post-Western order.

Beijing’s actions, however, often contradicted its professed multilateralism.

The militarization of the South China Sea, coercive economic tactics, and unilateral territorial claims undermined trust among neighbors, even as China promoted initiatives like the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA).

Institutional and Military Assertiveness

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) have been dual tools for expanding influence.

While the BRI fosters economic dependency, the SCO provides a platform for security cooperation with Central Asian states and Russia, counterbalancing U.S. alliances.

Militarily, China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the South China Sea and growing nuclear arsenal have redefined regional power dynamics, compelling smaller states to recalibrate their strategies.

The Indo-Pacific Counterstrategy: Minilateralism and Alliance Adaptation

The Quad and AUKUS: New Pillars of Containment

In response to China’s rise, the U.S. and its allies have revitalized the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and launched AUKUS, a trilateral pact focusing on nuclear submarines and advanced technologies.

The Quad, comprising the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia, has shifted from a loose consultative forum to a coalition coordinating maritime security, infrastructure investment, and critical supply chain resilience.

AUKUS, meanwhile, represents a technological leap, enabling Australia to project power in the South China Sea and beyond. Both frameworks exclude China, reflecting a clear intent to counterbalance its influence.

Reinventing Bilateral Partnerships

Traditional U.S. allies are pursuing deeper intra-Asian ties.

Japan has signed reciprocal access agreements with the UK and Australia, while South Korea has expanded defense cooperation with Southeast Asian nations.

Historically, non-aligned India now participates in joint naval exercises with Vietnam and the Philippines, signaling its role as a “net security provider” in the Indian Ocean.

These partnerships often bypass ASEAN-led mechanisms, prioritizing flexibility over institutional consensus.

ASEAN Centrality Under Strain

The Myth of Unity

ASEAN’s consensus-based approach has struggled to address divisive issues like the South China Sea disputes and Myanmar’s civil war.

While the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) advocates inclusivity and multilateralism, member states remain divided on China.

Cambodia and Laos, heavily dependent on Chinese investment, routinely veto stronger statements on maritime disputes, whereas Vietnam and the Philippines seek closer U.S. ties.

This fragmentation has eroded ASEAN’s credibility as a neutral mediator.

Alternative Platforms and Hedging Strategies

Southeast Asian nations are increasingly turning to multilateral arrangements outside ASEAN. Indonesia’s “ASEAN Plus” naval exercises with India and Australia and the Philippines’ Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the U.S. exemplifies this trend.

Even as ASEAN promotes the East Asia Summit (EAS) as its premier security dialogue, participation by non-Asian powers like the EU dilutes its regional focus.

The European Union’s Diminished Role

Economic Power vs. Security Irrelevance

The EU’s 2021 Indo-Pacific Strategy emphasized climate diplomacy, digital governance, and maritime security but lacked concrete military commitments.

While France maintains a strategic presence via its Pacific territories and joint bases in the UAE, broader EU engagement remains hamstrung by internal disagreements and a focus on regulatory standards over hard power.

China’s coercion of Lithuania over Taiwan relations and the bloc’s dependence on Asian trade routes have further exposed its vulnerability.

Conclusion

A Contested and Multipolar Future

The Asianisation of regional security architecture is not a coherent transition but a contested process marked by competing visions.

China’s push for a Sinocentric order faces resistance from U.S.-led multilateral networks and the hedging strategies of middle powers. While diminished, ASEAN retains symbolic value as a platform for dialogue, even as its members pursue bilateral deals.

The lesson for the EU is clear: without credible security contributions, its influence will wane.

As the Indo-Pacific becomes the epicenter of great power rivalry, the region’s future will hinge on whether transactional bilateralism can coexist with fragile multilateral norms—or whether a new crisis will force a definitive choice between containment and accommodation.