Learn from Soviet Collapse: Credibility Cannot Be Recovered Once Lost - Part VII

Executive Summary

Credibility, Signals, and Alliance Fragmentation: Strategic Lessons from the Soviet Collapse for 21st-Century Major Powers

The Eastern Bloc collapse of 1989 and the failed August 1991 coup against Gorbachev provide consequential lessons for contemporary major powers regarding credibility signalling, alliance management, and the relationship between demonstrated resolve and international stability. The critical mechanism through which these events affected Soviet stability was not economic decline or ideological exhaustion per se, but rather the signal created by the Soviet Union’s refusal to use force to maintain control over satellites and constituent republics.

Gorbachev’s deliberate choice not to authorise military intervention in Eastern Europe, though motivated by reform commitments and humanitarian considerations, communicated to Soviet republics that the centre lacked either capacity or will to suppress secessionism through force. The failed August coup, similarly, exposed the regime’s inability to enforce obedience even amongst its own elite and military establishment, signalling definitively that alternative power centres could challenge Soviet authority successfully. For contemporary major powers—particularly the United States managing a global alliance network, China consolidating regional dominance, and Russia reasserting its regional sphere—these events demonstrate that credibility consists not merely of stated commitments but of demonstrated willingness and capacity to execute those commitments under costly conditions.

The evidence suggests that contemporary great powers face three critical vulnerabilities derived from Soviet precedent: the credibility trap, wherein defending every ally credibly is economically and politically unsustainable, yet failing to defend allies undermines deterrence across the entire system; the signal problem, wherein actions in one region create demonstration effects shaping expectations and calculations in other regions; and the public support problem, wherein military commitments lack credibility if domestic publics do not support the threatened action.

Understanding and addressing these vulnerabilities represents the paramount challenge for 21st-century alliance managers seeking to prevent the cascade effects that transformed the Soviet decline into rapid institutional dissolution.

Introduction

The global order that has structured international relations since 1945 rests fundamentally upon credible security guarantees extended by dominant powers to subordinate allies. The United States, as the pre-eminent global power throughout the post-Cold War period, has anchored its entire geopolitical posture on a network of alliances, partnerships, and security guarantees extending to over sixty countries.

NATO alliance, US security commitments to Japan and South Korea, the implicit guarantee to Taiwan, and the broader architecture of American extended deterrence all depend upon a single critical element: credibility. Credibility represents the degree to which allies and adversaries perceive that the dominant power possesses both the capability to fulfil its commitments and the resolve to bear the costs of doing so.

The Soviet Union’s collapse illuminates the consequences when credibility erodes through demonstrated non-use of force, elite defection, and institutional incoherence. The Eastern Bloc collapse and August 1991 coup were not merely symptoms of underlying economic dysfunction but rather critical junctures wherein specific demonstrations of weakness and inability created cascading consequences.

Gorbachev’s refusal to use force in Eastern Europe, which might superficially appear as a humane and principled policy, functioned strategically as a signal: if Moscow would not maintain control over satellite states where the Soviet Union possessed historical dominance and strategic interests, Soviet republics could rationally conclude that Moscow would not use force to prevent their secession. The August coup’s failure, similarly, demonstrated that the regime could not enforce obedience even among its closest officials and military apparatus, signalling definitively that alternative power centres could successfully challenge Soviet authority.

For 21st-century major powers, these lessons carry urgent relevance.

The United States confronts a deepening “credibility crisis” as its military overmatch declines relative to peer competitors, as allies question American resolve in defending peripheral interests, and as the gap between public opinion and strategic commitments widens.

China, whilst currently consolidating regional dominance, faces potential credibility challenges if it overcommits militarily whilst domestic support erodes.

Russia, despite recent military assertiveness, remains constrained by economic fragility and limited military capacity for sustained conflict, yet must maintain credible regional deterrence to prevent NATO expansion.

Each of these powers operates within alliance systems vulnerable to the demonstration effects and credibility cascades evident in the Soviet collapse.[fee]

Key Strategic Mechanisms: Signal Theory and Credibility in Great Power Competition

The foundation of contemporary international security architecture is often overlooked: credibility is not merely a psychological concept but a material force that shapes state behaviour and international outcomes. States that develop reputations for honouring commitments find future alliance partners willing to cooperate. States that develop reputations for abandoning allies find themselves isolated and vulnerable. This reputation effect operates because states, rational actors seeking to maximise expected utility, condition their behaviour on their assessment of other states’ likely responses.

A state contemplating aggression against a weaker state asks: Will the dominant power intervene? The answer depends not merely on stated commitments but on the state’s assessment of whether the dominant power has demonstrated willingness to bear costs to honour its commitments elsewhere.

The Soviet Union’s Eastern Bloc withdrawal presented precisely such an assessment problem. When Poland’s Solidarity trade union re-emerged and won elections in June 1989 without Soviet military intervention, this communicated information to other Eastern European populations and governments: the Kremlin will not use force to preserve communist rule. When Hungary began dismantling its border fence with Austria in May 1989, permitting East German citizens to flee westward, this communicated: the centre cannot or will not enforce control over its periphery.

When the Berlin Wall fell on 9 November 1989 and Soviet troops did not intervene, this communicated with unmistakable clarity: Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe has dissolved. Each of these non-events—things Moscow historically would have prevented through military force but did not—constituted a powerful signal that Soviet capacity or resolve had fundamentally changed.

The cascade consequences followed inexorably. Soviet republics, observing Eastern Europe’s successful transition away from communist control without Soviet military suppression, began calculating whether similar independence was achievable for them.

The parade of sovereignties—Lithuania’s independence declaration in March 1990, Latvia’s in May 1990, Ukraine’s in summer 1990—proceeded not through popular revolution forcing the Kremlin’s hand, but through elite calculation of achievable outcomes. The signal from Eastern Europe had changed the cost-benefit calculation: Soviet suppression was no longer credible; independence therefore became politically achievable.

For contemporary great powers, this signal mechanism remains operative.

The United States’ military interventions (or refusals to intervene) communicate information about American willingness to bear costs in defence of commitments.

China’s military behaviour toward Taiwan and in the South China Sea communicates to regional actors whether China will use force to achieve objectives.

Russia’s military interventions in Georgia and Ukraine communicated to NATO members whether Russian military assertiveness could be checked. Each action creates demonstration effects shaping expectations in other regions and amongst other allies.

The contemporary US credibility challenge exemplifies this mechanism. The withdrawal from Afghanistan created a signal, however unintended, that the United States was unwilling to sustain military commitments indefinitely despite apparent domestic costs. This signal affected expectations not merely in South Asia but globally—allies in the Indo-Pacific questioned whether the US would sustain Taiwan defence, whether the US would defend the Philippines against Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea, whether the US commitment to Japan remained unwavering. The cascading effect operates through the logic of demonstration: if the US could not sustain Afghanistan commitment, can it sustain Taiwan commitment?

If the answer appears negative, then allies face incentives to hedge toward China or pursue independent nuclear deterrence rather than relying on US extended deterrence.

The Credibility Trap: The Dilemma of Extended Deterrence in Great Power Competition

The most sophisticated contemporary analysis of credibility identifies a fundamental paradox: the dominant power seeks to deter adversaries by making credible threats to intervene on behalf of allies, yet making those threats credible requires demonstrating willingness to bear substantial costs. However, the dominant power cannot afford to bear such costs in defence of every ally, nor can it make credible threats regarding every peripheral interest. This creates what strategists term the “credibility trap”: the dominant power must choose which commitments to emphasise and defend credibly, recognising that other allies, observing patterns of commitment and abandonment, will adjust their own strategies accordingly.

During the Cold War, the United States resolved this dilemma through nuclear deterrence extending to NATO allies.

The implicit commitment was that the United States would risk nuclear war to defend Western Europe against Soviet attack. This commitment, credible because the United States had demonstrated willingness to build the nuclear arsenal and maintain forward-deployed forces, was sufficient to deter Soviet expansion into Western Europe despite the Soviet Union’s conventional military superiority in Europe. The credibility derived not from promise but from demonstrable capability and institutional commitment (NATO structure, forward deployment, integration of command structures).

Contemporary US strategy faces a more complex version of the credibility trap.

The United States cannot credibly commit to defend all sixty-plus countries to which it extends security guarantees with the same level of resources and resolve. Taiwan presents a particular challenge: the US maintains a policy of “strategic ambiguity,” neither committing to defend Taiwan nor promising to stay out of a conflict. This ambiguity was designed to deter both Chinese military aggression and Taiwanese independence. However, strategic ambiguity creates a credibility problem: if the US is ambiguous about commitment, how can it deter Chinese military action through threat of intervention?

The leaked Pentagon “Overmatch” assessment reveals the severity of this credibility problem.

The assessment warns that the US would likely lose a high-end war with China over Taiwan under current conditions. This technical assessment, if discovered by adversaries, communicates that US military capability to defend Taiwan is questionable. Furthermore, polling data reveals that US public opinion does not overwhelmingly support military intervention to defend Taiwan from Chinese invasion. This public opinion gap creates a credibility problem: if Beijing calculates that the US public would not support Taiwan war, then the US threat to intervene becomes less credible.

The cascading consequence would be predictable: if China assesses US Taiwan commitment as not credible, China increases probability of military action. If China achieves military fait accompli over Taiwan, US credibility across the entire alliance system in the Indo-Pacific suffers.

Japan questions whether US commitment to defend Japan is credible. South Korea considers independent nuclear deterrence. Philippines reassesses US military presence. Australia hedges toward China. The demonstration effect ripples through the region as allies recalculate US reliability based on observed performance in Taiwan.

This credibility cascade is precisely analogous to the mechanisms evident in the Soviet collapse: When the Kremlin failed to suppress Eastern European independence, republics throughout the Soviet system recalculated their own prospects for secession. When the military refused to obey coup orders, elites throughout the system recalculated the regime’s survival prospects. Signal, observation, and cascading recalculation transformed structural decline into rapid institutional collapse.

The Signal Problem: Non-Use of Force and Credibility Perception

Strategic signal theory identifies a critical distinction between cheap talk (statements that cost nothing to make and can be disowned if circumstances change) and costly signals (actions that impose real costs and therefore convey credible information about intent).

In international politics, the primary costly signals concern military force: military deployments, military exercises, military preparedness, and military intervention all impose costs and therefore convey credible information about resolve.

Conversely, the non-use of force when force was historically employed to maintain dominance constitutes a powerful negative signal.

The Kremlin’s historical use of force in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968) had established a precedent: Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe would be maintained through military force if necessary. When Gorbachev broke that precedent by refusing to use force in Eastern Europe in 1989, this constituted a signal: the Kremlin’s willingness or capacity to use force had fundamentally changed. This signal was more credible than any statement or promise could have been, because it contradicted the Kremlin’s own established precedent and therefore conveyed authentic information about changed circumstances.

For contemporary NATO, this signal mechanism operates with full force. NATO’s credibility with Eastern European members depends substantially upon the perception that NATO will use force to defend members against Russian aggression. This credibility is maintained through: visible military deployments (forward-positioned forces in Poland, Baltic states); military exercises demonstrating NATO’s capacity for rapid reinforcement; NATO command integration; and explicit statements of commitment embodied in NATO Article 5. However, NATO’s credibility would be fundamentally undermined if NATO were to fail to respond militarily to direct Russian aggression against a member state. The non-response would signal that NATO is unwilling or unable to use force, thereby destroying deterrence across the entire alliance.

Russia, conversely, maintains regional deterrence through demonstrated willingness to use force. Russia’s military interventions in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014, 2022) communicated that Russia will employ military force to defend what it perceives as its regional sphere of influence. These interventions, despite international condemnation, signalled to potential NATO members (Georgia, Ukraine) that Russian military power could not be overcome through Western support alone. This signal has shaped calculations throughout the region: Ukraine resisted NATO membership partly because of Russian military demonstrated capacity; Georgia refrained from full NATO commitment partly for similar reasons.

The contemporary signal problem for the US concerns Taiwan and the wider Indo-Pacific. If the US demonstrably fails to defend Taiwan from Chinese military action, this signals globally that US extended deterrence commitments are not credible. The signal would be particularly potent because it would contradict explicit US statements of commitment and demonstrate that US capability to honour commitments has declined below what was previously assumed. Such a signal would cascade through the entire alliance system: Japan would perceive that US commitment to Japan is less credible; South Korea would question US resolve; Philippines would reassess US military partnership; Australia would hedge toward China.

The Public Support Problem: When Domestic Consensus Fails

A critical but often overlooked mechanism through which credibility functions concerns domestic political support. Military commitments are only credible if domestic publics support them; if publics do not support military action, leaders lack political capacity to execute commitments even if militarily possible.

The Soviet Union’s problem during the August 1991 coup was precisely this: the military units tasked with suppressing Moscow anti-coup protests lacked conviction that the regime was worth dying for. They possessed the military capability to suppress the protests; what they lacked was political will reinforced by domestic consensus. When soldiers refuse to obey orders because they lack conviction that the cause is just, military capability becomes inoperative.

Contemporary US Taiwan policy faces a severe public support deficit. Polling data reveals no overwhelming consensus amongst Americans for military action to defend Taiwan. Whilst 70% of Americans view Taiwan favorably and appreciate Taiwan’s importance to US security, significantly fewer Americans support military action in Taiwan’s defence.

When survey respondents are asked about specific military actions (sending troops, naval action), support declines substantially. This public opinion gap creates a credibility problem: Beijing observes American public opinion polling; if Beijing calculates that Americans do not support Taiwan war, then the US threat to intervene becomes less credible.

The mechanism through which domestic political support affects credibility is straightforward: leaders considering military action calculate the political costs. If a leader threatens military action without domestic support, Congress may refuse to authorise funding, the public may turn against the government, and allies may question whether the government can actually execute the threatened action. Conversely, if a leader threatens military action with demonstrable public support, the threat becomes more credible because adversaries understand that the government can and will execute it despite costs.

The Soviet experience demonstrates this mechanism in extreme form. The hardline coup plotters assumed that military units would obey orders to suppress Moscow protests because the military hierarchy commanded obedience. However, the military units lacked conviction that the regime was worth defending through force against civilians. Without domestic political support (soldiers perceived the regime as illegitimate), military capability became ineffective. The Kremlin could not use its military to suppress opposition because military personnel would not obey suppression orders without conviction that the system was worth defending.

For contemporary powers, the implication is clear: credible military commitments require demonstrating not merely military capability but domestic political consensus.

The US Taiwan commitment becomes more credible if Americans demonstrably support defending Taiwan; becomes less credible if Americans demonstrably oppose such action. China’s regional military dominance becomes less credible if Chinese domestic publics question military expenditure or military adventures. Russia’s military assertiveness becomes less credible if Russian publics question the costs of military campaigns.

Institutional Credibility and the Failure of Ambivalence

Gorbachev attempted to navigate a middle path between two unsustainable extremes: he wanted to permit sufficient political liberalisation to generate support for perestroika, but not so much liberalisation as to lose Communist Party control. He wanted to retain Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe, but without using military force to suppress nationalist movements. This middle path proved unstable: institutions cannot be credibly ambivalent. Once the Kremlin permitted criticism, the logical progression toward fundamental system critique became inevitable. Once the Kremlin refused to use force to maintain Eastern European hegemony, republics throughout the system began calculating independence was achievable.

The instability of ambivalent institutional positions creates a lesson for contemporary strategic competition: powers must choose between clear positions rather than attempting to maintain contradictory postures.

The US Taiwan policy of “strategic ambiguity”—neither committing to defend Taiwan nor promising to stay out—was designed to deter both Chinese aggression and Taiwanese independence. However, the ambiguity creates a credibility problem precisely because adversaries are uncertain whether the commitment is real. As military technology changes and the military balance shifts, ambiguity becomes increasingly unstable: does the commitment remain if the military balance tips toward China? Does it remain if Taiwan declares independence? The ambiguity itself becomes a vulnerability.

Similarly, NATO’s position toward Russia faces an ambivalence problem: NATO conducts deterrence operations but wants to avoid provoking Russia into military action. This middle position—deterring without threatening, reassuring allies without antagonising Russia—is increasingly impossible to maintain. Russia perceives NATO military reinforcement in Eastern Europe as threatening; NATO members perceive Russian military assertiveness as threatening. There is no ambivalent position from which both can be accomplished.

Cause-and-Effect Analysis: Cascading Credibility Collapse and Alliance Fragmentation

The chain of causality linking the Eastern Bloc collapse and August coup to Soviet dissolution proceeded through cascading credibility collapse. The Eastern Bloc collapse communicated to Soviet republics that the centre could not or would not suppress secessionism through force. This signal altered the cost-benefit calculation of independence: previously, independence had seemed impossible (the Kremlin would suppress it militarily); now it appeared achievable (the Kremlin had demonstrated unwillingness to use force). Elite calculations shifted accordingly: rather than seeking accommodation within the Soviet structure, republican elites began calculating that independence offered superior prospects.

The August coup’s failure reinforced this credibility collapse by demonstrating that the regime could not enforce obedience even amongst its closest officials and military apparatus. If the regime could not command military obedience against a civilian population, how could it suppress republic secessionism? The coup’s failure therefore accelerated elite defection cascades throughout the system: party cadres, military officers, and regional leaders who had been calculating whether to remain loyal to the Soviet centre concluded that the centre was terminal and defected to alternative power structures (Yeltsin’s Russian republic).

The cascading consequences proceeded inexorably: Ukraine’s December 1991 independence referendum (90%+ in favour) made Soviet existence mathematically impossible. The Belavezha Accords formalising Soviet dissolution followed logically from this point. The dissolution was not inevitable, but the cascade of credibility signals and demonstration effects had made it overwhelmingly likely.

For contemporary great powers, the causal mechanism remains operative. If the US were to fail in defending Taiwan from Chinese military action, this would signal globally that US extended deterrence commitments are less credible. This signal would cascade through the alliance system: Japan would question US commitment; South Korea would consider independent nuclear deterrence; Philippines would reassess US partnership; Australia would hedge toward China. Each ally’s recalculation, based on observing US failure to defend Taiwan, would reduce the credibility of US commitments globally.

Similarly, if NATO were to fail to defend a Baltic member against Russian military action, this would signal that NATO collective defence commitments are not credible. The cascade consequences would involve: Eastern European members accelerating military buildups or pursuing independent nuclear deterrence; Southern European members questioning NATO commitment; smaller NATO members reconsidering the alliance value. Each recalculation, based on observing NATO failure to enforce collective defence, would reduce NATO’s deterrent value.

Future Steps

Maintaining Credibility in Competitive Multipolarity

Contemporary major powers seeking to avoid the credibility cascades that preceded Soviet dissolution must attend to three critical mechanisms.

First, they must establish and maintain demonstrable military capability to execute threatened commitments. The US must maintain military superiority sufficient to deter peer competitors and defend allies against regional challengers. NATO must maintain military force positioning and rapid reinforcement capability sufficient to defend against Russian aggression. China must maintain military capability sufficient to deter US intervention in Taiwan whilst managing its extensive economic commitments throughout Asia. Russia must maintain military credibility sufficient to deter NATO expansion whilst managing its limited economic resources.

Second, major powers must establish clear, unambiguous commitments rather than attempting strategic ambiguity. Allies and adversaries require clarity regarding where commitments are absolute and where they are contingent. Ambiguous commitments create credibility problems because neither allies nor adversaries can reliably assess whether the commitment is real. The US should clarify its Taiwan commitment explicitly, accepting that clarity will provoke Chinese reaction but that ambiguity creates greater uncertainty and risk. NATO should clarify that Article 5 applies fully to all members regardless of geographic location. China should clarify under what circumstances it will use military force, establishing predictability rather than ambiguity.

Third, major powers must maintain domestic political consensus regarding military commitments. Credible military commitments require public support; leaders cannot execute commitments without political capacity to do so. The US must work to build public consensus for Taiwan defence rather than relying on strategic ambiguity that permits inaction despite public opposition. NATO members must maintain public support for collective defence and military expenditure on NATO. China must maintain public support for military readiness. Russia must maintain public support for military assertiveness despite economic constraints. Without domestic consensus, military capabilities become operationally ineffective because political leaders lack the domestic political support necessary to execute threatened action.

Additionally, major powers should avoid the trap of attempting ambivalent institutional positions. Either use force to maintain control over peripheries (as the Soviet Union did historically) or accommodate periphery autonomy (as post-1989 Kremlin implicitly chose), but do not attempt middle paths combining both. Either maintain forward-deployed military forces in allies’ territories to signal absolute commitment or withdraw those forces and negotiate purely economic/technological partnerships, but do not maintain contradictory postures that appear to signal mixed commitment. The strategic clarity that such choices provide, though potentially provoking short-term adversary reaction, establishes the predictability necessary for long-term stability.

Conclusion

Learning from Institutional Collapse to Prevent It

The Eastern Bloc collapse and the August 1991 coup demonstrate that institutional collapse proceeds not from external defeat or inevitable structural forces but from cascading credibility problems that undermine elite confidence in the regime’s survival. When credibility deteriorates through demonstrated non-use of force, military refusal to obey, and institutional ambivalence, elite actors throughout the system recalculate their interests and defect to alternative power structures. This elite defection cascade, once initiated, becomes self-reinforcing: each additional elite defection increases uncertainty about regime viability, thereby accelerating additional defections.

For 21st-century major powers managing alliance systems and military commitments, the lessons are decisive. Credibility is not merely rhetoric or strategic posturing but a material force that shapes behaviour throughout international systems. Credibility deteriorates when capabilities decline, when resolve is questioned, when public support erodes, or when institutional positions become ambivalent. Once credibility deteriorates, alliance systems face fragmentation risks analogous to those that preceded Soviet dissolution.

The United States, as the contemporary dominant power managing the most extensive alliance network, faces acute credibility challenges: military overmatch declining relative to peer competitors, public support gaps between stated commitments and public opinion, and strategic ambiguity regarding key commitments like Taiwan. Addressing these challenges requires maintaining demonstrable military capability, establishing clear unambiguous commitments, building public consensus, and avoiding ambivalent institutional positions.

China faces credibility challenges in maintaining regional dominance whilst managing economic interdependence with potentially adversarial regional powers. Russia faces credibility challenges in projecting regional influence with limited economic and military resources. None of these challenges are insurmountable, but all require treating credibility as the fundamental strategic asset that it demonstrably is.

The ultimate lesson from the Soviet collapse is both cautionary and instructive: credibility, once lost, is extraordinarily difficult to recover. Regimes that demonstrate unwillingness or inability to enforce authority through force, that suffer military defections, that face elite defections to alternative power structures, rarely recover.

Conversely, powers that maintain credible commitment through demonstrated capability, clear institutional positions, and domestic political support can sustain alliance systems and geopolitical dominance even against substantial structural challenges.

The choice between trajectories is not determined by underlying structural conditions but by strategic decisions regarding credibility maintenance.