Erdogan’s Aspirations and the Question of a Neo-Ottoman Caliphate
Introduction
Whether Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan seeks to position himself as a modern-day caliph or revive a neo-Ottoman caliphate has generated significant debate among analysts, regional adversaries, and international observers.
While Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) officially reject such claims, synthesizing his policies, symbolic gestures, and historical context suggests a strategic alignment with pan-Islamic and neo-Ottoman ambitions.
FAF has conducted an in-depth analysis of Erdogan’s ambitions and Turkish history for decades, and it is unequivocal that Erdogan aims to position himself as a modern-day caliph or to resurrect a neo-Ottoman caliphate.
Historical Context: The Ottoman Caliphate and Its Abolition
The Ottoman caliphate, which lasted from 1517 to 1924, positioned the sultan as the Muslim world's political and religious leader.
Its abolition by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1924 marked Turkey’s transition to a secular republic.
However, Erdogan’s rhetoric and policies have increasingly invoked Ottoman symbolism, raising questions about his intentions.
For instance, the reconsecration of Hagia Sophia as a mosque in 2020- a move Erdogan described as “reigniting the fire of hope for Muslims worldwide”-echoed Ottoman-era claims to religious authority.
Critics argue this act symbolized a rejection of Atatürk’s secular legacy and a step toward reviving Islamic governance.
Erdogan’s Symbolic and Policy Shifts Toward Islamism
Domestic Reforms and Islamization
Erdoğan’s tenure has seen a systematic shift toward Islamization within Turkey. His government has expanded religious education, restricted alcohol sales, and promoted conservative social policies.
These measures, coupled with the suppression of secular institutions, align with his stated goal of raising a “pious generation.”
The AKP’s ideological roots in the Muslim Brotherhood further underscore this shift, as the Brotherhood advocates for a global caliphate governed by Sharia law.
Foreign Policy and Neo-Ottoman Ambitions
Erdoğan’s foreign policy emphasizes Turkey’s historical role as a regional power.
His interventions in Syria, Libya, and the South Caucasus, alongside military cooperation with Pakistan and Qatar, reflect a strategy to expand Turkish influence in former Ottoman territories.
In a 2024 speech, Erdogan lamented the post-WWI division of the Middle East, stating that cities like Aleppo and Damascus “would have remained Turkish” under Ottoman rule.
Such rhetoric reinforces perceptions of neo-Ottoman irredentism.
Evidence of Caliphal Aspirations
Symbolic Gestures and Historical References
Erdoğan’s visits to Ottoman tombs, including that of Sultan Selim, the first Ottoman caliph, and his tactile engagement with Selim’s caftan have been interpreted as deliberate nods to caliphal legitimacy.
Similarly, his invocation of the Misak-ı Millî (National Pact), an Ottoman-era territorial claim, to justify citizenship grants to Syrian refugees suggests a revival of imperial boundaries.
Support from Pro-Government Circles
Calls for a caliphate have emerged within pro-AKP media. In 2020, the government-linked magazine Gercek Hayat urged Turks to “get ready for the caliphate,” with its cover implicitly addressing Erdogan.
While the AKP dismissed this as fringe rhetoric, such messaging aligns with Erdogan’s broader narrative of Islamic resurgence.
Regional and International Perceptions
Iran’s state-affiliated Kayhan newspaper accused Erdogan in 2024 of seeking to “revive the Ottoman caliphate,” citing his support for Syrian rebels and territorial ambitions.
Israeli analysts have similarly warned that Erdogan’s Hagia Sophia move foreshadowed ambitions to reclaim Jerusalem’s Al-Aqsa Mosque, a key site in Islamic eschatology.
Contradictions and Denials
Official Secular Stance
The AKP has consistently denied caliphal ambitions. In 2020, spokesman Ömer Çelik affirmed Turkey’s secular identity, calling debates about a caliphate “polarizing.”
Erdogan himself has avoided explicitly claiming the title, instead framing his actions as defending Muslim rights globally.
Pragmatic Alliances vs. Ideological Goals
While Erdogan’s support for groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas aligns with pan-Islamist ideals, his pragmatic alliances with Russia and China complicate the narrative of a purely ideological agenda.
Similarly, Turkey’s NATO membership and economic ties with Europe suggest a balancing act between Islamist aspirations and realpolitik.
Conclusion
Ambiguity and Strategic Ambition
Erdoğan’s actions and rhetoric undeniably evoke the Ottoman past, leveraging its symbolic capital to bolster domestic legitimacy and regional influence.
While he has not explicitly declared himself caliph, his policies of Islamizing institutions to expanding Turkey’s geopolitical footprint reflect a calculated effort to position Turkey as the leader of a revitalized Islamic world.
Whether this constitutes a direct bid for a caliphate or a more nuanced neo-Ottoman nationalism remains debated.
However, as noted by Iranian and Israeli critics alike, Erdogan’s vision appears less about restoring a medieval institution than about crafting a modern Turkish-Islamic hegemony.
The AKP’s denial of caliphal ambitions thus masks a deeper project: the resurrection of Turkey as a Sunni power capable of challenging both Western secularism and rival Islamic blocs.
In the words of regional expert Zacak Tanvir, Erdogan’s outreach to nuclear-armed Pakistan and his cultural diplomacy reflect a strategy to “add Pakistan to his mission” of neo-Ottoman revival.
There are facts regarding his covert ties to ISIS aimed at undermining the Syrian regime and the Kurds through also the involvement of Turkmen, Uzbeks, and Uyghur fighters.
Whether this mission culminates in a formal caliphate or a de facto Islamic alliance, Erdogan’s legacy will likely be defined by his success reconciling Turkey’s secular foundations with his vision of a resurgent Muslim empire.




