Trump’s Iran Nuclear Diplomacy: Navigating an Intractable Problem
Introduction
The second round of nuclear talks between the United States and Iran concluded in Rome on April 19, 2025, marking a potentially significant step in addressing one of the most challenging diplomatic issues on the international stage.
Despite initial skepticism, the talks yielded some progress, with both sides agreeing to continue negotiations and technical discussions in Oman in the coming week.
However, substantial obstacles remain, including deep-seated distrust, conflicting objectives, and a complex web of regional dynamics that make Iran’s nuclear ambitions a problem with no straightforward solution.
The Revival of US-Iran Nuclear Diplomacy
The current diplomatic initiative represents a consequential shift following years of escalating tensions between Washington and Tehran.
During his first term, President Donald Trump withdrew from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), criticizing it as “defective at its core” and implementing a “maximum pressure” strategy through severe economic sanctions.
This withdrawal in 2018 prompted Iran to gradually abandon its commitments under the agreement, dramatically accelerating its uranium enrichment program to 60% purity—dangerously close to the 90% threshold considered weapons-grade.
Trump’s return to the White House has brought a renewed if unexpected, diplomatic engagement with Iran.
After sending a letter to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei suggesting the possibility of negotiating a new nuclear deal, diplomatic channels were established, with Oman serving as mediator.
The first round of talks took place in Muscat on April 13, followed by the Rome meeting on April 19, where US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi led their respective delegations.
The geopolitical context of these negotiations is particularly complex. Iran’s regional position has weakened considerably, with two of its proxies—Hamas and Hezbollah—significantly degraded by Israeli military operations and its own missile production and air defense capabilities compromised by Israeli strikes.
Additionally, Iran’s economy faces severe challenges due to sanctions, corruption, and mismanagement, creating potential pressure for concessions.
Nevertheless, Iranian officials maintain that their participation in talks is not motivated by fear of military strikes but rather by the narrowed focus on nuclear issues.
The Rome Talks: Threading a Diplomatic Needle
The second round of negotiations in Rome lasted approximately four hours at the Omani Embassy in the Camilluccia neighborhood.
Following the talks, both sides characterized the meeting as productive. Araghchi described it as “a good meeting” where the negotiations are “moving forward,” adding that they “managed to reach a better understanding on a series of principles and goals.”
The Trump administration indicated that “excellent progress” was made in direct and indirect discussions.
Perhaps most significantly, the parties agreed to accelerate the pace of negotiations. Technical experts will meet in Oman on Wednesday, April 23, to “start designing a framework for an agreement,” according to Araghchi.
This will be followed by a third high-level meeting in Oman next weekend. Omani Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi, who has played a crucial mediating role, expressed optimism, stating on social media that the “talks are gaining momentum and now even the unlikely is possible.”
Iranian officials emphasized that the US delegation has thus far focused exclusively on nuclear matters, avoiding other contentious issues such as Iran’s support for regional proxies or its ballistic missile program.
This single-issue approach appears to be a deliberate strategic choice by the Trump administration, recognizing the challenges of pursuing a more comprehensive agreement within its desired timeframe.
The Diplomatic Tightrope: Competing Interests and Internal Divisions
The US and Iranian negotiating teams face significant domestic constraints and internal divisions that complicate the path to an agreement.
In Washington, Trump’s desire for a quick diplomatic win clashes with the positions of hardline advisors, including National Security Adviser Michael Waltz and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who oppose allowing Iran any nuclear enrichment capability.
This tension has manifested in confused messaging about US objectives, with Witkoff initially suggesting Iran could maintain uranium enrichment at 3.67%, then later emphasizing the need to “eliminate” Iran’s nuclear program.
President Trump has framed the negotiations in characteristically stark terms, declaring there are “two ways Iran can be handled, militarily or you make a deal.”
While threatening force, he has also expressed a preference for diplomacy, stating, “I want Iran to be great and prosperous and terrific. But they can’t have a nuclear weapon”.
This combination of threats and incentives reflects Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy and creates uncertainty about US red lines and negotiating parameters.
In Tehran, Supreme Leader Khamenei remains deeply skeptical of US intentions, having previously stated that “negotiations with the US are neither wise nor rational and will do nothing to solve Iran’s problems.”
Nevertheless, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s reformist government, elected on promises of sanctions relief through diplomatic engagement, has pushed for talks.
According to Iranian sources, Khamenei ultimately permitted negotiations after advisors warned that, given the military pressures, refusing dialogue could threaten the Islamic Republic’s survival.
Iran’s negotiating position reflects these internal tensions. While open to discussions, Tehran has rejected any “Libya model” that would require complete dismantlement of its nuclear infrastructure.
Ali Shamkhani, an advisor to Khamenei, emphasized before the Rome talks that “Iran has come for a balanced agreement, not a surrender.”
Foreign Minister Araghchi affirmed that while Iran is willing to address concerns over enrichment levels, “the enrichment principle is non-negotiable.”
The Technical Challenges: Verification and Implementation
Beyond the political complexities, any potential agreement faces significant technical hurdles, particularly regarding verification mechanisms.
Rafael Mariano Grossi, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), met with Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani in Rome on the same day as the nuclear talks, highlighting the crucial role the UN atomic watchdog would play in verifying compliance with any deal.
Araghchi has acknowledged the importance of the IAEA, stating that the agency bears sole responsibility for verifying and monitoring Iran’s nuclear obligations and that Iran “does not recognize any other organizations for verification purposes.”
However, establishing a robust verification regime remains challenging, given Iran’s past resistance to specific inspection protocols and the advanced state of its nuclear program.
The technical discussions scheduled for next week will likely focus on critical parameters such as uranium enrichment levels, stockpile limits, and centrifuge capabilities.
While Iran may be willing to return to the 3.67% enrichment cap established in the 2015 JCPOA, questions remain about what happens to its existing stockpile of 60% enriched uranium and its advanced centrifuges.
These details will determine whether any agreement effectively prevents Iran from rapidly “breaking out” to develop a nuclear weapon if it chooses to do so.
Israel: The Wild Card in the Equation
Israel’s position adds another layer of complexity to the negotiations. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has consistently advocated for a maximalist approach, arguing that only military action or complete dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure can prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
The New York Times reported that Trump recently dismissed an Israeli proposal to target Iranian nuclear facilities as soon as next month, preferring to give diplomacy a chance.
This represents a significant shift in the US-Israel dynamic on Iran. During Trump’s first term, he generally aligned with Netanyahu’s hardline position but now appears more willing to pursue a diplomatic path that may not fully satisfy Israeli security demands.
Trump has suggested that Israel might “take the lead” in any military strike should negotiations fail, but his current preference for diplomacy has potentially created tension with Netanyahu.
For Iran, Israel’s military capabilities represent a serious threat, as demonstrated by recent strikes against Iranian missile production and air defense systems.
However, Tehran may calculate that Netanyahu’s ability to oppose a US-Iran agreement is more limited than during the Obama administration when the Israeli leader made a controversial address to Congress criticizing the JCPOA negotiations.
The Clock Problem: Different Timeframes and Expectations
One of the most significant obstacles to a successful agreement is Washington's and Tehran's different senses of urgency and timing.
Characteristically impatient, Trump wants a quick resolution and reportedly set a two-month timeframe for finalizing a deal.
He has already expressed concern that Iran may be “tapping him along” and dragging out negotiations.
Iran, conversely, may see a strategic advantage at a more deliberate pace. Some analysts suggest Tehran might aim to extend talks beyond October when the JCPOA's “snapback provisions”—which would reimpose all previous sanctions in the event of Iranian non-compliance—are set to expire.
This could give Iran leverage to secure more favorable terms or to buy time while maintaining its nuclear advancement.
These different timeframes create a fundamental tension in the negotiation process.
Aaron David Miller and Lauren Morganbesser observe, “Impatient and impulsive by nature, Trump wants the deal done yesterday, or at least within two months. For the Iranians, negotiations likely have two speeds—slow and slower”.
A Problem Without a Solution?
The fundamental challenge facing negotiators is whether a solution can satisfy both sides' core requirements.
The US seeks to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons capability, while Tehran insists on maintaining its right to uranium enrichment for peaceful purposes and demands comprehensive sanctions relief.
As Miller and Morganbesser argue, “There are no great deals, good options, or Hollywood endings when negotiating with Iran on the nuclear issue.”
The only way to guarantee Iran would never acquire nuclear weapons would be a fundamental regime change that eliminated the desire for such capabilities—an unlikely scenario in the foreseeable future.
Instead, the most realistic outcome may be a transactional, limited agreement rather than a transformational one.
Such a deal might temporarily constrain Iran’s nuclear program through caps on enrichment and stockpiles, coupled with robust verification measures, in exchange for partial sanctions relief.
However, this would fall short of a comprehensive solution to the Iran nuclear problem and would likely face criticism from hardliners in both Washington and Tehran.
Conclusion
As the third round of US-Iran nuclear talks approaches, the path forward remains fraught with obstacles. The Rome meeting demonstrated that diplomacy is possible, with both sides willing to continue negotiations despite their profound differences.
Yet the fundamental challenge remains: finding an agreement that balances Iran’s insistence on maintaining enrichment capabilities with the US demand for verifiable limits that prevent weaponization.
Trump’s diplomatic initiative represents a pragmatic recognition that military options carry significant risks and uncertainties. However, his administration’s mixed messaging and internal divisions complicate a challenging negotiation.
Similarly, Iran’s participation reflects a calculation that diplomacy serves its interests better than confrontation, but Tehran’s red lines on enrichment and distrust of US intentions create substantial barriers to agreement.
In the coming weeks, technical discussions may clarify whether a viable compromise exists. Yet, as the title of the Foreign Policy analysis suggests, Iran’s nuclear ambitions may represent “a problem without a solution”—at least in the comprehensive, lasting sense that both sides claim to seek.
The most likely outcome may be a temporary, imperfect arrangement that manages rather than resolves the underlying conflict, reflecting the intractable nature of one of the world’s most complex diplomatic challenges.
