Executive summary
A large research project has shown that China is now ahead of other countries in most critical new technologies.
These include advanced batteries, many kinds of artificial intelligence, quantum communication, hypersonic flight, and some space systems.
The project looks at the most‑cited scientific papers in each field.
In about 90% of these key technologies, Chinese universities and labs publish more of that top work than anyone else.
Some experts say that in a few areas China is “two generations ahead.”
This comes from sectors like mobile networks and chips, where each new “generation” is a big jump, such as going from 3G to 4G to 5G, or from 14‑nanometer chips to 7‑nanometer to 3‑nanometer.
If a country is two such steps in front, others might need many years and several product rounds to catch up.
These facts are reshaping world politics.
The United States is tightening controls on key technology exports to China and putting more money into its own industry.
Europe is trying to “de‑risk,” which means reducing its dependence on Chinese supplies in some sectors without fully cutting ties.
Many developing countries are trying to use Chinese and Western technology at the same time, while avoiding too much pressure from either side.
What the ASPI tracker shows?
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute created the Critical Technology Tracker to measure which countries lead in important new technologies.
It collects millions of scientific papers and then focuses on the 10% that receive the most citations in each field.
These highly cited papers are usually the ones that shape future research and products.
The first version of the tracker, released in 2023, covered 44 technologies in nine groups, such as defense, space, AI, energy, and biotechnology. It found that China led the world in 37 of those 44 technologies, while the United States led in seven.
Later updates added more technologies, first reaching 64 and then 74, including new areas such as generative AI, some quantum systems, and more types of advanced materials. In the most recent update, China ranked first in 66 of 74 technologies, close to 90%.
In many of these fields, China does not just win by a small margin. In some technologies, Chinese institutions publish more than five times as many high‑impact papers as the next country.
In a few areas, all of the top 10 research organizations are Chinese. This gives China a strong base for turning ideas into real machines, networks, and services.
The tracker does not say that China is number one in every part of every technology.
For example, in the most advanced chip‑making tools, China still depends on foreign suppliers.
But overall, the picture is clear: China has become a central source of cutting‑edge knowledge in most of the technologies that will matter for armies, factories, and digital life in the coming decades.
What two generations ahead means?
When experts say China is “two generations ahead” in some technologies, they are trying to explain how far in front it is, not just in level but in time.
In many industries, progress comes in clear steps.
In mobile networks, the world moved from 3G to 4G to 5G, and now people talk about 6G.
In chips, companies move from older, larger nodes to smaller ones, such as 10‑nanometer, 7‑nanometer, 5‑nanometer, and beyond.
Each step brings better performance and often new uses.
If China is two such steps ahead, it means its systems or research programs are already working at a stage that others will reach only after two full upgrade cycles.
In fast‑moving sectors, that can mean a lead of 5–10 years.
For example, China has already built a nationwide quantum communication network and sent quantum‑secure signals between space and Earth.
Many other countries are still at early testing stages and will need several rounds of work to reach the same point.
However, it is important to note that this “two generations” idea does not apply everywhere.
In cutting‑edge chip manufacturing, most independent experts say that Chinese firms are still behind the global leaders by one-two generations, even if they are catching up in older types of chips. In some quantum computing areas, US institutions remain in front.
So the phrase “two generations ahead” is a useful picture in some fields, but it should not be treated as a fixed rule for all technologies.
Why this matters for world politics?
Technology now sits at the center of global power.
In the past, countries measured strength mainly with tanks, ships, and classic industry.
Today, the most powerful states are those that control chips, networks, AI systems, satellite constellations, and advanced materials.
These systems decide how fast armies move, how secure financial flows are, and how societies communicate.
For the United States, China’s technological rise is seen as a major challenge to long‑held advantages.
Washington fears that if China leads in AI, quantum, and hypersonics, it could threaten US military positions in Asia and reduce US control over global financial and digital networks.
For this reason, the US government has set strict rules on selling advanced chips and chip‑making tools to China, and it has started big funding programs to rebuild domestic factories and research centers.
Europe worries less about hard power rivalry and more about economic dependence.
Many European industries rely on Chinese inputs, from rare earths and batteries to solar panels and telecom equipment. If tensions rise, China could cut or limit these flows, causing serious trouble.
That is why European leaders now talk about “de‑risking.” They want to keep trade where it is safe, but they also want new suppliers and some homegrown capacity in critical sectors, even if that costs more.
For countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, China’s tech lead offers both chances and dangers.
On the positive side, Chinese companies often bring ready‑made solutions at lower prices: complete 5G networks, smart‑city systems, cloud services, and cheap clean‑energy equipment.
This can help these countries grow faster and close gaps with richer states.
On the negative side, such deals can create long‑term dependence on Chinese hardware, software, and finance. If political or security disputes arise later, it can be hard and expensive to switch providers.
There is also a values issue. Some of the technologies where China is strong, like AI‑powered facial recognition and big‑data policing platforms, fit well with governments that prefer strict social control and limited criticism.
When such systems are exported, they may help leaders monitor opponents, control media, and weaken democracy.
That is why many human rights groups and democratic governments worry about the spread of what they call “digital authoritarianism.”
What could happen next?
Several paths are possible for the next 10–15 years.
One path is deeper “tech decoupling.” In this case, the world would slowly split into two different technology systems.
One system, led by the US and close allies, would have its own chips, networks, and standards.
The other, led by China, would have different chips, networks, and standards. Some countries would mainly use US‑linked technology; others would mainly use Chinese systems.
Products and data might not easily move across the two systems.
Another path is more managed competition. In this version, rivalry stays strong, but both sides accept that full separation is too costly and too risky.
They draw red lines in a few very dangerous areas, such as cyber‑attacks on power grids or the use of AI in nuclear command systems, and try to agree on basic rules.
In other areas, like climate technology or public health, they continue some level of cooperation and trade.
A third path is messy but more plural. Power in different technologies might be spread across many players.
China might lead in some sectors, the US and Europe in others, and rising powers such as India, South Korea, or Brazil in still others.
Many countries could then mix and match suppliers, trying to avoid full dependence on any single partner.
This would not remove rivalry, but it might reduce the pressure to choose one camp for everything.
Conclusion
China’s new strength in critical technologies marks a major turning point in global politics.
It shows that long periods of heavy investment, planning, and learning can move a country from being a follower to being a leader in many of the tools that will shape the 21st century.
When experts say China is “two generations ahead” in some fields, they mean that in those areas it may take years, and several waves of innovation, for others to reach the same level.
Yet China’s lead is not total. It still relies on foreign tools and designs in core places, especially in the most advanced chip‑making equipment, and it faces its own economic and social tensions.
The United States, Europe, and other advanced economies still control key chokepoints and have strong research communities.
How they choose to respond—through panic and overreaction, or through calm, long‑term strategy—will help decide whether the coming tech age is mainly about confrontation or about a difficult but manageable kind of shared progress.
For the rest of the world, the main task is to keep as much freedom of choice as possible.
That means avoiding one‑sided dependence, building local knowledge, and using competition between big powers to secure better deals without losing political autonomy.
In a world where critical technologies are becoming the main currency of power, this kind of careful balancing will be one of the hardest arts of statecraft.
